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ADOPTION: ABANDONMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT
P sought to adopt her son's illegitimate child against the pro-
tests of D and wife, adoptive father and natural mother. D and
wife first sent the child to its natural father for adoption, and then
sought to withdraw their consent when P instituted the adoption
proceedings. P lived in Georgia and brought the action in the
county where she resided. D and wife, citizens and residents of
England, filed caveat and by personal appearance protested the
adoption. The natural father resided in Florida and was not a
party to the case.
Except where the natural parents have abandoned their child,
their consent is an essential requirement for a valid adoption;
also indispensable is the jurisdictional requirement that the child
sought to be adopted must be domiciled in the state. GA. CODE
ANN. SuPP. No. 74-403. Held: The adoptive father, D, forfeited
his right to legal custody of the child through cruel treatment,
and his sending the child to her natural father for adoption consti-
tuted abandonment. Altree v. Head, 90 Ga. App. 601, 83 S.E. 2d
683 (1954).
It is generally held that adoption creates the same relation
between adoptive parent and child as the relation between a nat-
ural parent and child. McDonald v. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n.,
267 S.W. 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) error ref. D, then, was
entitled to the same rights of custody as a natural parent. How-
ever, D in the principal case released such right to the child's
natural father and under Georgia statute the child's domicile
became that of the person to whom the parental authority was re-
linquished. GA. CODE ANN. Supp. No. 79-404. Since the natural
father's residence was in Florida, it would seem that the child
was not domiciled in Georgia so as to give jurisdiction over her
to a Georgia court. (The child had been living with P for a short
time with the natural father's consent.) The residence necessary
to confer jurisdiction under adoption statutes is legal residence
1955]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
or domicile as distinguished from a temporary or casual habita-
tion. Re Webb, 65 Ariz. 176, 177 P. 2d 222 (1947).
The opinion admits that ordinarily consenting to adoption and
placing the child in the temporary custody of the prospective
parents for this purpose are not acts constituting abandonment.
This is in accord with the view of the great majority of jurisdic-
tions, that abandonment requires a present intent to sever entirely
the parental relation. Nelson v. State, 77 Ga. App. 225, 48 S.E.
2d 570 (1948). The opinion apparently holds that the cruel
treatment by D is sufficient to distinguish this case from the ordi-
nary one. Here it should be noted that the only testimony as to
cruelty was that of the child. The doubtful probative value of
such testimony is shown by the trial judge's refusing to hear
further testimony by the child and by his preventing any cross-
examination. It seems at best doubtful whether such testimony
would be sufficient to prove abandonment by a natural parent.
Another question presented by the decision is the right of
parents to withdraw their consent to an adoption of their child.
The earlier cases held that consent can be withdrawn at any time
before the adoption is finally approved, and that such right is
absolute and not dependent upon any particular reason. Platzer
v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N.W. 956 (1921). The more
recent trend seems to be that consent given freely and knowingly
is not arbitrarily revocable if acted upon. Re Adoption of a Minor,
144 F. 2d 644 (D. C. 1944).
In no case have the courts gone so far, however, as to deny
withdrawal of consent solely because the adopting parents have
superior advantages. Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S.W. 2d
457 (1944). In the writer's opinion that is in essence what the
court has done in the present case. While the child's best interest
is the paramount test in custody proceedings where the separation
of parent and child is temporary, this is not true in adoption pro-
ceedings where the separation is permanent. The child's best inter-
est in the latter situation is often subordinated to the rights of
the parents. Platt v. Moore, 183 S.W. 2d 682, (Tex. Civ. App.
1944) error ref. This case seems to be another unfortunate illus-
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tration of the old maxim that "hard cases make bad law," and
it will be regrettable if the decision is used to create chaos out of
the established rules as to parental rights.
Dawson French.
CRIMINAL LAW - HOMICIDE - INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
The accused, in a state of intoxication, was permitted to enter
the house of the deceased to seek aid in repairing a damaged
automobile. He and his companions set up a rumpus among them-
selves and engaged in loud and boisterous conduct. Upon request
to do so, the accused left the house; he returned shortly and loudly
struck upon the door requesting admission. He did not, however,
reenter the house. The deceased, suffering from an extreme hyper-
tension, lapsed into unconsciousness and died several days later
from a cerebral hemorrhage. Held: conviction and sentence of
one year in prison for involuntarily manslaughter reversed. Graves
v. Commonwealth ........ Ky ......... , 273 S.W. 2d 380 (1954).
The court reached the only logical and fair disposition of the
case by reversing the conviction. As the court pointed out, there
could at best be mere speculation in determining if the acts of the
accused were the proximate cause of the death. The question in this
case is not whether the death of the deceased is the natural result
of the accused's act, but whether his act is the proximate cause of
the death. In Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566, 110 Pac. 1029
(1910), the deceased died of an aneurysm (a rupture of the
aorta descending into the vena cava) after witnessing an alterca-
tion between her son and the defendant. The court reversed the
conviction in that case considering it unreasonable to hold the de-
fendant guilty of the death of a person toward whom he had made
no overt act or attack and where there was no finding that the act
of the accused was the direct and actual cause of the death. It was
pointed out that the result would have been different had the
deceased died of terror or fright resulting from an assault on her.
There is authority in Kentucky cases to the effect that one can
not escape criminal liability merely because factors other than
his own act, such as predisposed physical condition, contributed
to the death. Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 941, 80 S.W.
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156 (1904). However, it is generally held in Kentucky that in
order to uphold a conviction of homicide, the act of the defendant
must be the proximate cause of death; if there is an intervening
cause, for which the accused is not responsible and without which
the death would not have occurred, he is blameless. Hubbard v.
Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 202 S.W. 2d 634 (1947). It must
be remembered that the accused in the principal case was not re-
sponsible for the condition of the deceased, and, as was held in
Commonwealth v. Couch, 32 Ky. 638, 100 S.W. 830 (1908),
the sickness and death of the deceased can not by any reasonable
stretch of the imagination be considered as probably resulting
from being disturbed by the acts of the accused. Cf. Common-
wealth v. Owens, 198 Ky. 655, 249 S.W. 792 (1923), CLARK AND
MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES, 314 (2d ed. 1912).
A person simply cannot be held criminally responsible without
some degree of culpability being shown and without his act being
shown to be the proximate cause of death. Proximate cause, as
used in these cases, means the act nearest in casual relation to the
death of the deceased. Persons in a poor physical condition which
reaches a lethal climax during a crisis or disturbance, such as
occurred in the principal case, cannot be said to be the victim
of the accused's criminality if there is no act or conduct of the
accused which is directed toward the deceased. If the rule were
otherwise, the witnessing of everyday social incidents and acci-
dents by those in feeble health, who might ultimately die as a
result of the same, would make us all guilty of a crime of homi-
cide of some degree.
]oe H. McCracken, III.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX - CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR EVASION -
THE NET WORTH THEORY
In a prosecution for income tax evasion using the net worth
theory, the government established an "opening net worth" or
total value of all of D's net assets at the beginning of the taxable
year. The increase of this value during the year was computed,
and to this figure were added D's nondeductible expenditures.
To the extent that this sum exceeded D's reported taxable income,
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the government claimed it to be unreported taxable income. D
contended that the increase claimed by the government reflected
the expenditure of hidden hordes of cash acquired prior to the
taxable year. The government negatived this contention with evi-
dence of D's hardship during the period of alleged savings. Fur-
ther evidence showed that D reported only one-fourth as much
profit from his hotel as the previous owner reported in the prior
year although the business increased. Held: The government need
not investigate the claim that income is nontaxable if this matter
is peculiarly within D's knowledge, but it must introduce evidence
supporting the inference that D's net worth increases are attributa-
ble to currently taxable income. Conviction Affirmed. United
States v. Hollands, 75 Sup. Ct. 127 (1954).
If the net worth method is used it is essential that the cost of
all assets owned at the beginning and at the end of the taxable
year be established within a reasonable degree of certainty.
Sasser v. United States, 208 F. 2d 535 (5th Cir. 1953). In that
case the taxpayer had no records and was unsuccessful in claim-
ing that his opening net worth should have included large sums
of hidden cash. There are two apparently conflicting views as to
who has the burden of proving these net worth estimates. One
view is that the government must exclude every possible source
of nontaxable income, United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 488,
491 (7th Cir. 1949), and the evidence must exclude every rea-
sonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt. Bryan v.
United States, 175 F. 2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949). The other view is
that the government is not required to prove a negative or refute
all possible speculation as to the source of the defendant's funds,
Gariepy v. United States, 189 F. 2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951), and
when the government has made out a prima facie case the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the income was non-
taxable. United States v. Link, 202 F. 2d 592 (3rd Cir. 1953).
Convictions were reversed in the Bryan and Fenwick cases; in
the former the government's auditor admitted that he did not
know if he had included in the defendant's opening net worth all
of his assets, and in the latter the government failed to check
claims by the defendant that he owned war bonds, stock, and in-
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surance not included in his opening net worth. The Fenwick case
is criticized in Remmer v. United States, 205 F. 2d 277 (9th Cir.
1953), and limited to facts in United States v. Yeoman-Hen-
derson, 193 F. 2d 867 (7th Cir. 1952). See also Brodella v.
United States, 184 F. 2d 823, (6th Cir. 1950) for a discussion
of the Bryan and Fenwick cases.
The opinion in the principal case impliedly approves of the
holding in the Bryan and Fenwick cases by requiring the govern-
ment to investigate all "leads" furnished by the defendant rea-
sonably susceptible of being checked. The government is relieved
of this obligation, however, if the matter is peculiarly within the
defendant's knowledge. This is an attempt, on the one hand, not
to put an impossible burden of proof on the government, and, on
the other hand, not to subject the defendant to possible prejudice
before the jury by requiring him to prove his claims where to do
so might reveal a fraud on his creditors, past illegal transactions,
etc.
The opinion expressly places the burden on the government to
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
After the government has made out its prima facie case, however,
the defendant remains silent at his peril, Yee Hem v. United States,
268 U. S. 178 (1925). The principal case injects an element
into prosecutions of this type that has not previously been stressed
-the government must introduce evidence supporting the infer-
ence that the defendant's net worth increases are attributable to
currently taxable income. In this case there was evidence that
the defendant had substantially under-reported the income from
his hotel business. It is probable that the government in most cases
will be able to point out a source of currently taxable income to
which the jury can attribute the net worth increases. It is con-
ceivable, however, that the government could negative non-taxable
sources, and yet fail to point out a possible taxable source. In
such a case, if the matter is peculiarly within the defendant's





MONOPOLIES - LIVE PRESENTATIONS OF LOCAL EXHIBITIONS AS
CONSTITUTING TRADE OR COMMERCE WITHIN THE SHERMAN ACT
In two recently decided cases, U. S. v. International Boxing
Club, 75 Sup. Ct. 259 (1955), and U. S. v. Shubert, 75 Sup. Ct.
277 (1955), it appears that the United States Supreme Court
has receded from its former position of considering live athletic
exhibitions as not subject to 15 U. S. C. A. § 1, 2, 4 (Sherman
Anti-Trust Act); 15 U. S. C. A. § 29 (Expediting Act). Both cases
were handded down the same day, and both opinions were rendered
by Chief Justice Warren.
In the IBC case the complaint grew out of the control which
the International Boxing Club has over fighters in the major box-
ing centers of the country. This control exists by virtue of owner-
ship of the available premises at which boxing exhibitions can
be given. The government contended that the sale of television,
radio, and film rights to these exhibitions was of such magnitude
as to constitute trade or commerce within the meaning of the Act.
The defendants, relying on the old case of Federal Baseball Club
v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922), and the more recent
case of Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U. S. 356 (1953), con-
tended that live local exhibitions of an athletic nature were not
the subject of commerce. This defense was bottomed on the theory
that the sale of such rights was merely incidental to the exhibition
and could not color the character of the exhibition so as to con-
vert it into "commerce" within the meaning of the Act. In a 7 to 2
decision the complaint was upheld, and this defense was rejected.
A similar result was reached in the Shubert case, which in-
volved the performance of live shows in the legitimate theatre,
Again the government contended that by control of the major
theatres in the Northeastern section of the country the defendants
were violating the Act. Jurisdiction was predicated upon the move-
ment of large amounts of stage equipment across state lines, and
the interstate nature of the promotion of these shows. The defend-
ants, here, as in the IBC case, relied upon the Toolson case as
exempting live local exhibitions from the terms of the Act. The
court in this case was unanimous in holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action, basing its decision on the case of Hart
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v Keith Vaudeville, 262 U. S. 271 (1923). It should be noted
that in both the IBC case and the Shubert case the only question
involved was the sufficiency of the complaint.
Examining the decisions relied upon by the court, the first case
of modern importance on the subject is that of Federal Base Ball,
wherein Justice Holmes held that the transportation of players
across state lines did not transform the sport into interstate com-
merce. He stated that "... . the transport is a mere incident, not
the essential thing." This case was construed shortly thereafter
in the Hart case, which subjected vaudeville companies to the
terms of the Act where their activities were interstate. Justice
Holmes again wrote the opinion. He distinguished the Federal
Base Ball case by stating "... . that it may be what, in general,
is incidental, in some instances may rise to a magnitude that re-
quires it to be considered independently." Thereby the proposition
was laid down that in some cases interstate activities, usually inci-
dental to a live presentation, may rise to a status which will sub-
ject the whole exhibition to the Act.
In the most recent case, Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, the plaintiff
contended that professional baseball was interstate commerce and
relied upon the above statement from the Hart case. He also relied
upon the lower court's opinion from Gardello v. Chandler, 172
F. 2d 402 (1949), which held that the nature of radio and films,
and the advent of television have impressed upon professional
baseball an element now so intrinsic to the sport that the sale of
such rights colors the whole. This case was ignored and profes-
sional baseball was again exempted from the terms of the Act.
With this background of decisions, the court in the IBC case
reasoned that as the court in the Toolson case expressly stated
that the decision was made without a re-examination of the under-
lying issues, that case did not re-affirm the application of the Fed-
eral Base Ball case other than as it applied specifically to profes-
sional baseball. Chief Justice Warren was of the opinion that if
it were not for the prior decisions in Federal Base Ball and
Toolson he would have no trouble in subjecting the IBC to the
terms of the Act.
He distinguished the two cases by stating "Surely there is noth-
in the Hart case to suggest, even remotely, that the Court was
[Vol. 9
RECENT CASE NOTES
drawing a line between athletic and non-athletic entertainment";
the controlling consideration in the Federal Base Ball and Hart
cases was ". . . instead a very practical one-the degree of inter-
state activity involved in the particular business under review."
Again in the Shubert case he relegates the decision in the Toolson
case to a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis.
It appears that the Court in the IBC case is formulating a doc-
trine which heretofor has been applied only in the lower court's
decision in the Gardello case. The doctrine now enunciated will
characterize live presentations of local exhibitions as constitut-
ing inter-state commerce, within the meaning of the Sherman
Act, if the exhibition is coupled with incidents of an interstate
character and such incidents are of a magnitude so as to color
the entire exhibition. Such a doctrine is clearly one of degree, and
the sole exception apparently will be professional baseball. How-
ever, this exception seems hard to justify upon legal principle,
in view of the IBC case, and it is this writers view that should pro-
fessional baseball become as scandal ridden as professional box-
ing federal control will be imposed forthwith. The IBC case is
another caveat to the states that unless they keep their houses in
order there will be another invasion of their so-called states rights.
R. W. Hemingway
MUNICIPAL TAXATION: CLASS SUITS FOR RELIEF FROM
DISCRIMINATORY PROPERTY VALUATION
In a class action, a group of taxpayers brought suit against a
municipality and its tax officials to enjoin the city from collecting
taxes based on illegal methods of property valuation. The injunc-
tion was granted by the trial court on the ground that arbitrary,
illegal and fundamentally wrong methods used by the tax officials
had resulted in a lack of uniformity and equality of taxation to
the taxpayer's substantial injury. The court of civil appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, but the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. Held: If the contention is that the evaluation for
tax purposes is discriminatory, proof of excessiveness of substan-
tial injury is required of every taxpayer who seeks relief; an in-
junction will not lie in favor of a class of taxpayers who fail to
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show individual injury. City of Arlington v. Cannon, ........ Tex.
........ , 271 S.W. 2d 414 (1954).
The court of civil appeals in affirming the trial court stated that
if the methods of a tax board result in discriminatory valuations
and unequal assessments, proof of the specific amount of injury
to each taxpayer "is impractical if not impossible to be shown in
a class suit." Thus an injunction will be granted as the proper
remedy. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the
procedures used by the tax board were unlawful, and that the
courts will grant relief in cases where the application of a funda-
mentally wrong standard or method results in substantial injury
to the complainant. See: Druesdow v. Baker, 229 S.W. 493 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921); Rowland v. Tyler, 5 S.W. 2d 756 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928); Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Lubbock Ind. School Dist., 85
S.W. 2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). However, the Supreme Court
reversed the court of civil appeals, holding that each taxpayer
contesting the board's action must show that he has been injured
by the illegal method before an injunction will lie. Query: What
must the complainant show in order to prove substantial injury
in this situation?
In deciding this question, the court relied almost exclusively on
the recent decision in State v. Whittenburg- ........ Tex ......... , 265
S.W. 2d 569 (1954), wherein the court ruled that the necessary
showing of substantial injury can only be made by proof that
a substantially higher amount was assessed against the complain-
ant's property than was assessed against property interests of
equal or greater market value owned by others.
Such cases as Montgomery County v. Humble Oil & Rfg Co.,
245 S.W. 2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref, n.r.e., and
State v. Whittenburg illustrate the principle that Texas courts are
strict in refusing to enjoin tax collections based on illegal methods
of property valuation unless the taxpayer is able to produce proof
of substantial injury. The principal case extends this policy to
requiring each taxpayer in a class action to show individual injury.
The court admits that it is practically impossible for the tax-
payers as a class to produce the proof necessary to entitle them
to relief under the rule of the Whittenburg case. The taxpayers
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did produce evidence of specific acts of discrimination and dis-
parities, but did not prove that each individual taxpayer had his
property assessed substantially higher than property of equal or
greater market value owned by others in the city.
The result of this case seems harsh. Under this ruling each
taxpayer will be forced to bring his own suit in order to show that
his property valuation is excessive within the test of the Whitten-
burg case. The cost of individual suits is so prohibitive that it
is unlikely that many taxpayers will sue individually to save the
few dollars of taxes. The court, by denying equitable relief in the
only practical action that can be brought to contest a tax board's
decision, is in effect denying all relief.
Robert K. Pace.
STATUTES: USE OF A LATER STATUTE AS AN EXTRINSIC AID IN
INTERPRETING AN EARLIER STATUTE
In Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954),
$665 was paid to a New Jersey state trooper in lieu of meals
served at trooper stations. The Bureau of Internal Revenue con-
tended that under the 1939 Code this amount represented compen-
sation for services rendered and was includible in gross income;
the trooper maintained that the amount was not includible by
virtue of the "convenience of the employer" rule. In holding the
amount not to be includible, the court rejected the Bureau's
contention that committee reports during formulation of the 1954
Code should be taken into consideration in construing the meaning
of the 1939 Code. These committee reports revealed that the House
Ways and Means Committee believed this type of expense to be
compensation for services and includible in gross income; the
committee then proceeded to recommend such payments be
exempted (which was done in Section 120, 1954 Code). The
Circuit Court stated at page 775, "The general rule is that later
statutes may not be used as an aid in the interpretation of earlier
acts. It is the legislative intent at the time of enactment and not
its afterthoughts which should be controlling." The court cited
1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.28 (1942)
as authority for this rule. Mertens, in turn, replied principally on
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Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523 (1920),
in which it was held that no aid can possibly be derived from
legislative history of an act passed subsequent to the act being
construed by that court. Accord: American Exchange Securities v.
Helvering, 74 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1934).
Diametrically opposed to this concept is a considerable body of
authority. See Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 208
U.S. 452 (1908), which held that "[i]t is settled that subsequent
legislation may be considered in the interpretation of prior legisla-
tion of the same subject." Accord, Hubbell v. Commissioner, 150
F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1945).
In Estate o Shedd v. Commissioner, 23 TC - No. 8 (Oct.
15, 1954), it was held that the commissioner properly determined
a deficiency based on the 1939 Code, in that the interest of dece-
dent's widow in a trust created by decedent's will did not qualify
for the marital deduction under Section 812 (e) of the 1939 Code.
In rejecting the executor's contention that Section 2056 of the
1954 Code should be resorted to as an extrinsic aid in interpreting
its counterpart in the 1939 Code, the court was careful to point
out that if the section of the 1939 Code had been ambiguous, the
1954 Code and committee reports thereon could have been used
in intepreting the 1939 Code. The court simply felt that there was
no ambiguity in the case.
The general rule obtained from recent cases thus seems to be
that a court will follow the "plain meaning rule" in interpreting
the old code if there is no ambiguity present. The prevailing philo-
sophy of the highest court in the land, as well as of most inferior
courts, is that unless a statute is susceptible of but one plain mean-
ing, all manner of extrinsic aids may be utilized, even an occa-
sional speech on the floor of Congress. (Cf. F.H.E. Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1945), holding a joint
resolution of Congress may properly be used as an aid in inter-
preting an earlier statute on the subject). Similarly, all of the
statute law pertaining to a particular subject should be regarded
as a unified system. Therefore, it is submitted that when a particu-
lar section of the 1939 Code is susceptible of more than one
plain meaning, consideration should be given to the corresponding
[Vol. 9
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section in the 1954 Code as well as to the attendant committee
reports in arriving at the true meaning of the 1939 Code.
When it is remembered that there is no statute of limitations
on civil fraud in tax matters and a full six-year limitation on
criminal fraud, it becomes apparent that the 1939 Code will re-
main a fruitful source of litigation for many years hence. Usually
large individual and corporate taxpayers consent to the waiver
of the three-year statute of limitations so the Commissioner may
have ample time to audit the return. In many cases the ultimate
liability is not determined for eight or ten years, and refund or
deficiency is predicated on the existing code at the time of filing
the return. It therefore is inescapable that construction of the
1939 Code will remain a problem for many years.
Lee V. Williams, Jr.

